This was related to reques-redirect usage with a file upload in the request.
More info at the Jira...
Thanks: Sebastian Berg and Benjamin Jugl for report
Prevents an useless inevitable warning by commenting out
RequestWrapper::getParameterNames and with it all the unused methods in
RequestWrapper class
Also better comments CacheFilter::doFilter by giving its real and only goal:
<<to prevent a post-auth security issue described in OFBIZ-12332>>
This definitely solves all issues by introducing a CacheFilter and
RequestWrapper classes inspired by several works found on the Net.
Also moves the change introduced before in ContextFilter to CacheFilter.
The basic problem is that you only can use once
ServletRequest::getInputStream or the ServletRequest::getReader
Also not both, even once, ie they can be seen as same from this POV.
The integration tests all pass.
Also replace the checked String "</serializable>" by "</serializable" as, like
reported by Jie Zhu, the former could be bypassed by using "</serializable >"
Thanks: Jie Zhu for report
# Conflicts handled by hand
CacheFilter.java
RequestWrapper.java
This definitely solves all issues by introducing a CacheFilter and
RequestWrapper classes inspired by several works found on the Net.
Also moves the change introduced before in ContextFilter to CacheFilter.
The basic problem is that you only can use once
ServletRequest::getInputStream or the ServletRequest::getReader
Also not both, even once, ie they can be seen as same from this POV.
The integration tests all pass.
Also replace the checked String "</serializable>" by "</serializable" as, like
reported by Jie Zhu, the former could be bypassed by using "</serializable >"
Thanks: Jie Zhu for report
Conflicts: ContextFilter.java handled by hand
(after discussing this on security@ofbiz.apache.org, it was decided to open a
Jira issue for that)
I've noticed that OFBiz Framework sometimes uses static initialization vectors
(IV) while creating a cipher:
https://s.apache.org/vhlbjhttps://s.apache.org/nyndk
IVs should be unique and ideally unpredictable to avoid producing the same
ciphertexts for the same plaintexts.
The issues can be fixed with something like the following:
byte[] rawIV = new byte[8];
SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();
random.nextBytes(rawIV).
IvParameterSpec iv = new IvParameterSpec(rawIV);
jleroux: this prepends the IV in order to decrypt the plaintexts. It's similar
to what has been done for the DesCrypt class. But contrary to the DesCrypt class
I did not test.
Thanks: Artem Smotrakov
Conflicts handled by hand (a lot)
ValueLinkApi.java
(after discussing this on security@ofbiz.apache.org, it was decided to open a
Jira issue for that)
I've noticed that OFBiz Framework sometimes uses static initialization vectors
(IV) while creating a cipher:
https://s.apache.org/vhlbjhttps://s.apache.org/nyndk
IVs should be unique and ideally unpredictable to avoid producing the same
ciphertexts for the same plaintexts.
The issues can be fixed with something like the following:
byte[] rawIV = new byte[8];
SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();
random.nextBytes(rawIV).
IvParameterSpec iv = new IvParameterSpec(rawIV);
jleroux: we prepend the IV in order to decrypt the plaintexts. I'll do
something similar in ValueLinkApi class ASAP
Thanks: Artem Smotrakov
Conflicts handled by hand:
framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/crypto/DesCrypt.java
When trying to add a note to WorkEffort entity, I found that URL encoded
characters are unescaped, which is not expected.
e.g.:
1. Go to page: https://demo-trunk.ofbiz.apache.org/workeffort/control/EditWorkEffortNotes?workEffortId=TASK01
2. Add a note with content: https://example.com/a%20link
3. After submission, it will turned to be: https://example.com/a link
Thanks: Xin Wang for report and exchanges until solution I provided
Conflicts:
UtilHttp.java: removes unused OOTB checkURLforSpiders for simplification
UtilValidate.java: replaces DEFAULT_EMPTY_OK simply by true
When creating a plugin via gradle :
./gradlew createPlugin -PpluginId=plugin-test -PpluginResourceName=PluginTest
-PwebappName=plugin-test -PbasePermission=PLUGIN_TEST
and loading all the required data and permissions, the plugin doesn't appear
in the menu.
It comes from the ComponentConfig.java file, L1229, when the permissions gets
trimmed and modified. I tried removing it locally and it fixed the problem.
Thanks: Gaetan Chaboussie
In SafeObjectInputStream.properties
Renames listOfSafeObjectsForInputStream to allowList and fixes it
Introduces a denyList
Adapts SafeObjectInputStream class to new denyList
Conflicts handled by hand
framework/base/config/SafeObjectInputStream.properties
framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/SafeObjectInputStream.java
Prevents generics markup in string type names.
Conflict handled by hand
framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/SafeObjectInputStream.java
This removes the inoffensive but annoying message in log (which does not show in
trunk, see https://github.com/apache/ofbiz-framework/commit/27c9180/
Not the same as in trunk, simply handling with exception Rather than returning
null, also shorten java.rmi.server to java.rmi to block more cases
That's for (low) security reason. There are no bugs in R17 and R18 but after
reading about FREEMARKER-124 at
https://freemarker.apache.org/docs/versions_2_3_30.html
I believe we should update update Freemaker to 2.3.31 in R17 and R18
app-shortcut-screen="component://product/widget/catalog/CatalogScreens.xml#ShortcutApp"
was present in applications/product/ofbiz-component.xml
but not in ofbiz-component.xsd
We missed to unescape EcmaScript encoded strings in
UtilCoded::checkStringForHtmlSafe, ie in all form fields using allow-html="safe"
Thanks: 牛治 <niu.zhi@zte.com.cn> for report
Conflicts handled by hand => no functional changes in code (ude to IDE setting)
framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/UtilCodec.java
2020/08/10 the OFBiz security team received a security report by Harshit Shukla
<harshit.shukz@gmail.com>, roughly it was (quoting part of it to simplify):
<<I have identified a Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability. The reason
behind this RCE is lack of file extension check at
catalog/control/UploadCategoryImage?productCategoryId=CATALOG1_BEST_SELL&pload_file_type=category>>
Using this post-auth RCE in OFBiz demos, Harshit was able to get some AWS
credentials by uploading a webshell (based on [0]).
By security, it was then decided by the Infra and OFBiz security teams to shut
down the demos.
After discussing the elements reported with Mark J Cox (VP of ASF security team)
we in common decided that no CVE was necessary.
# Conflicts handled by hand:
# applications/content/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/content/data/DataResourceWorker.java
# applications/content/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/content/data/DataServices.java
# applications/product/groovyScripts/catalog/category/EditCategory.groovy
# applications/product/groovyScripts/catalog/config/EditProductConfigItemContent.groovy
# applications/product/groovyScripts/catalog/imagemanagement/ImageUpload.groovy
# applications/product/groovyScripts/catalog/imagemanagement/SetDefaultImage.groovy
# applications/product/groovyScripts/catalog/product/EditProductContent.groovy
# applications/product/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/product/image/ScaleImage.java
# applications/product/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/product/imagemanagement/FrameImage.java
# applications/product/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/product/imagemanagement/ImageManagementServices.java
# applications/product/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/product/product/ProductServices.java
# build.gradle
# framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/FileUtil.java
# framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/HttpRequestFileUpload.java
# framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/template/FreeMarkerWorker.java
# framework/security/config/security.properties
While working with FileUtil::unzipFileToFolder I noticed that it's vulnerable to
Zip slip vulnerability: https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability.
Fortunately OOTB code does not use FileUtil::unzipFileToFolder so I did not
create a CVE, nor reported to
https://github.com/snyk/zip-slip-vulnerability#user-content-projects-affected-and-fixed.
If you think we should please shime in...
Removes a warning:
UtilMisc.java:202: warning: [rawtypes] found raw type: Iterator
Iterator itr = arrayList.iterator();
^
missing type arguments for generic class Iterator<E>
where E is a type-variable:
E extends Object declared in interface Iterator
This error appears after trying to upload a file to party content:
2020-11-06 07:48:22,488 |jsse-nio-8443-exec-7 |RequestHandler |I|
Sending redirect to:
[https://localhost:8443/partymgr/control/viewprofile?partyId=admin].
2020-11-06 07:48:29,288 |jsse-nio-8443-exec-7 |UtilObject |E|
null
java.io.NotSerializableException: org.apache.commons.fileupload.disk.DiskFileItem
# Conflicts handled by hand
# framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/UtilMisc.java
# framework/webapp/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/webapp/control/RequestHandler.java
For this issue (OFBIZ-8302) I reverted the point 1 of
http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1759555
As reported by Alvaro Munoz from GH security team it's not sufficient:
<<the second part of the fix was not effective, since the attacker can close the
raw string context with a double quote and write a new attribute or even close
the macro tag and write arbitrary FreeMarker code.>>
So this removes the 2nd part and add better solution to fix the OFBIZ-8302 issue
The solution is to encode only the QueryString and to handle it correctly in
UtilHttp::getParameterMap. I must say it was not a sinecure!
# Conflicts:
# framework/base/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/base/util/UtilHttp.java
# framework/widget/src/main/java/org/apache/ofbiz/widget/renderer/macro/MacroFormRenderer.java
Thanks to Alvaro's explanations, the problem was in MacroFormRenderer where, for
lookups, we retrieve _LAST_VIEW_NAME_ as a parameter without encoding it.
Thanks: Alvaro for advice
Conflicts handled by hand in UtilHttp.java
(OFBIZ-11714)
In OFBIZ-10539, We missed removing the line which was adding parameters into the map as Ritesh suggested a good way to handle parameters. I've removed that redundant line of code and attaching a patch for the same.
(OFBIZ-11709)
Some people may want to use another TemplateClassResolver than SAFER_RESOLVER
This creates a new templateClassResolver security property and uses it in
FreeMarkerWorker::makeConfiguration by default
Conflicts handled by hand
framework/security/config/security.properties
(OFBIZ-11709)
Since Freemarker 2.3.17 a known solution to these issues is to register a
TemplateClassResolver in Freemarker configuration in order to limit which
TemplateModels can be instantiated in the templates. The predefined resolver
SAFER_RESOLVER doesn't allow to instantiate the Execute class[4].
So the solution is to add the line
newConfig.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER);
in FreeMarkerWorker.java
Conflicts handled by hand
(OFBIZ-10837)
While working on OFBIZ-11633 I crossed an issue in R18 (not in trunk) where
objects from org.apache.commons.fileupload (namely DiskFileItem and
FileItemHeadersImpl) are not serializable.
While at it I decided to handle at the SafeObjectInputStream level
the "fileItems" case I already crossed with, OFBIZ-11534, in RequestHandler
It has an inconvenient in R18 (not in trunk) where ObjectInputStream can't
handle a null class (of course) and so return a benign exception in log (only).
I believe it's better to handle these specific cases at the lower possible
level in all supported branches.
(OFBIZ-11246)
It seems that same request can not be parsed multiple times if it has multi part
object in it as the parse method remove it after that.
Found one stackoverflow link around the same:
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/13881272/
servletfileuploadparserequestrequest-returns-an-empty-list
I believe that all places/uploads using this workflow should resulting the same
issue.
One possible solution I could think of without going with new approach is to set
list of file Items into the request attribute and use it if parse method remove
it and unable to retrieve on 2nd call.
Thanks: Ankush Upadhyay for the analysis and initial patch. I only slightly
modified it.
(OFBIZ-11470)
As reported by OWASP ZAP:
A cookie has been set without the SameSite attribute, which means that the
cookie can be sent as a result of a 'cross-site' request. The SameSite attribute
is an effective counter measure to cross-site request forgery, cross-site script
inclusion, and timing attacks.
The solution was not obvious in OFBiz for 2 reasons:
1. There is no HttpServletResponse::setHeader. So we need to use a filter
(SameSiteFilter) and even that is not enough because of 2:
2. To prevent session fixation we force Tomcat to generates a new jsessionId,
ultimately put in cookie, in LoginWorker::login. So we need to add a call to
SameSiteFilter::addSameSiteCookieAttribute in
UtilHttp::setResponseBrowserDefaultSecurityHeaders.